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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Because Respondent has chosen to ignore the numerous authorities cited by Appelknte and to gloss over
the main contentions of Appellants, but instead has raised
additional issues not dealt with in Appellants' Brief,
Appellants deem it necessary to file this reply to the
new issues raised.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants reaffirm their statement of facte in their
initial brief and make the following clarifications of assertions made in Respondent's statement of facts:
On page 2 of Respondent's Brief it is asserted that
Appellants failed to make payments due Intermountain,
were therefore in default under Contract "B" and that
this default caused the payments under Contract "A" to
become delinquent. This assertion is only an allegation
of Respondent's Cross-Claim (R. 31-32) which was denied by Appellants (R. 34-36) and is yet to be determined
by the court. Furthermore, Intermountain's obligation
to the Plaintiff under Contract "A" was an independent
obligation and its default under that contract was its
own fault and was in no way caused by Appellants.
ARGUMENT
THE COOMBS' ALLEGATION OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT "B" WAS
D E N I E D BY INTERMOUNTAIN AND
PROVED UNTRUE WHEN INTERMOUNTAIN PURCHASED AT THE SHERIFF'S
SALE. THE ALLEGATION WAS MADE TO
AVOID A MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS AND
CONSTITUTED NO ELECTION TO GIVE
UP ANY CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY.
The Respondent's sole contention in his brief is that
the Coombs, by claiming anticipatory breach of conitract
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by Intermountain, "elected" to treat the contract as
broken and are estopped from changing their minds to
claim an interest in the property. This contention is
based entirely on the allegation of anticapatory breach
in the Coombs' Cross-Claim. The alleged anticipatory
breach was based upon Intarmountain's failure to make
payments as required under Contract "A" which resulted
in the foreclosure action by Plaintiff. Had Intermountain
lost its interest in the property in this foreclosure, it
would have been unable to provide title to the property
to the Coombs as required under Contract "B". This
would have been a breach of Contract "B" for which the
Coombs would have been entitled to recover damages.
However, Inteimountain denied that it had committed
anticipatory breach and, by purchasing the property at
Sheriff's sale, obtained title to the property and made
it possible to provide good title to the Coombs under
Contract "B". Therefore, the claim of anticipatory breach
proved untrue. There being no anticipatory breach, the
Coombs had no election of remedies to make. Contract
"B" is still in effect and the Coombs are not estopped
from claiming the property sold to them under the contract.
Horman's reliance upon Hurwitz v. David K. Richard's Company, 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P. 2d 794 (1968), is
misplaced. That case does not hold "that where anticipatory breach of contract is alleged, the party so alleging
has the following options . . . " a s claimed by Horman.
Instead, by way of dictum, it states that "if there had
been an anticipatory breach, Richards had three options
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. . ." The court held there was no anticipatory brteach
because there had been no "positive and unequivocal
manifestation" that the contract would not be performed.
Furthermore, it stated that a repudiation may be withdrawn before the time for performance arrives unless the
other party manifests an election to rescind the contract
or materially changes his position in reliance on the repudiation. Likewise, there was no anticipatory breach
in the case before the court and therefore the options
stated in that case were not available to the Coombs here.
Since the claim of anticipatory breach was premature
and proved untrue, the only claim yet to be resolved was
the allegation by Intermountain, in its Cross-Claim, that
the Coombs were in default under Contract "B" and
that Intermountain should be "released from all obligations in law and equity to convey said property." This
allegation of default was denied by the Coombs and is
yet to be resolved by the court. There has been no trial
or other hearing concerning this issue. It was Intermountain that requested the count to terminate the interest
of the Coombs. Yet Intermountain has taken no action
to have the court rule on this issue. Until this question
of default by the Coombs has been tried, and until the
interest of the Coombs in the property under Contract
"B" has been properly terminated, the Coombs still have
an interest in the property of which all purchasers (including Horman) must take notice. The purpose of the
Third-Party Complaint against Horman is to declare his
deed null and void or at least to subject his deed to any
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interest in the property that might eventually be decreed in the Coombs in this lawsuit.
Why then did the Coombs allege anticipatory breach
and why are the allegations of hreach retained in its
subsequent pleadings? The answers should be obvious.
The claim was originally made in order to settle all claims
in one suit in the event Intermountain did not purchase
the property at Sheriff's sale nor redeem it after the
sale. The claim of breach would then have been valid.
The reason for retaining* the damage claims against Intermountain is to protect the Coombs' claim in the event
Horman should prevail on this appeal and the property
is therefore beyond the reach of the Coombs. But if the
interest of the Coombs in the property is still effective
and the property can be conveyed by Intermountain,
then the damage claims are no longer valid. The Coombs
are not attempting to affirm the contract in part and
to rescind it in part, as claimed by Horman, but merely
to pursue alternative claims which depend upon the
outcome of this appeal.
It should be remembered that it was Intermountain
that asserted a default in this case. The long delay in
this case is the fault of Intermountain for not having
pursued its claim of default. And without ever proving
its case, and while its own Cross-Claim was stiH pending,
Intermountain attempted to dispose of the property subject to that Cross-Claim. The Coombs are only asking
for a resolution of the claims asserted by Intermountain.
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If in fact the interest of the Coombs has been forfeited
or otherwise terminated, then they have no claim against
Horman. But if the interest of the Coombs is still valid
and effective, then Horman took his deed subject to that
interest.
Because Horman relies entirely on his claim that the
Coombs elected to sue for damages, he has failed to respond to the main contentions in Appellants' Brief. I t is
therefore assumed that he agrees with the arguments
that purchase at the Sheriff's sale by Intermoxmtain reinstated Contract "B" and that the recorded Contract
"B" and lis pendens effectively gave Horman notice of
the interest of the Coombs. He also does not dispute
that he had actual notice of the interest of the Coombs.
Rather, he chose to ignore these facts, of which he had
actual and constructive notice, and took a deed from
Intermountain under the mistaken assumption that the
Coombs had elected to rescind the contract — which
they have never done. For this mistake he has recourse
against his seller, Iiitermountain.
CONCLUSION
The Coombs' allegation of anticipatory breach did
not establish such a breach. In fact the lack of such a
breach has been established. They, therefore, had no
remedy to elect. They have waited for Intermountain
to prove its claim of default and until that, and proper
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termination of the contract are proved, they retain their
interest in the property. Since Horman had both actual
and constructive notice of the interest of the Coombs, his
deed should be made subject to that interest, whatever
the court may determine that interest to be.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Ralph J. Marah
Attorney for Appellants
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